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 1 
FREE SPEECH AT WHAT COST?: SNYDER V. PHELPS AND 
SPEECH-BASED TORT LIABILITY 
Jeffrey Shulman* 
“[T]he right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed in the 
scales with the right of others to communicate.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The constitutional law on speech-based tort claims is something 
akin to a doctrinal funhouse.  A bewilderment of public and private 
mirrors, fact and opinion trapdoors, it is law that balances private and 
public interests in a complicated and ever-shifting calculus.  Thus, when 
I say that the Fourth Circuit got it wrong in Snyder v. Phelps,2 it is with 
no little sense of the challenges a court would face to get it right.  It is 
always a hard case when fundamental interests collide, but the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision tilts doctrine too far in the direction of free speech, 
upsetting the Supreme Court’s careful weighing of interests that takes 
into account both the need for robust political debate and the need to 
protect private individuals from personal abuse.  The court’s reasoning 
in Snyder follows the lead set out by the Supreme Court in Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell,3 but that was a case with different types of actors, 
a different type of speech, a different communicative setting, and 
different policy concerns to consider.  The Fourth Circuit failed to give 
these differences due weight, and took a step too far when it applied 
New York Times4 protection to speech undeserving of such 
constitutional solicitude.  The court muddled through the law, 
illustrating how unfair it can be to apply to private parties doctrine 
 
 
*
 Associate Professor, Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law Center. 
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison.  For their 
continuing support of my scholarship, I would like to thank Professors Robin West and Steven 
Goldberg.  My discussions about this article with Professor David Wolitz were of invaluable 
assistance.  My thanks to May Chiang for expert editorial assistance.  (Professor Shulman 
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Albert Snyder to the Fourth Circuit.  See Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Jeffrey I. Shulman in Support of Appellee, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(No. 08-1026), 2008 WL 3460050.). 
 
1
 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). 
 
2
 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010). 
 
3
 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 
4
 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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developed to protect public discourse; but it was a muddle of the 
Supreme Court’s making—and it will be up to the Supreme Court to 
unmuddle it. 
With unfeigned caution, then, I want to make four modest points 
about the Fourth Circuit’s decision, each of which addresses the need to 
secure what is purely private from injurious speech. 
 
1.  The Fourth Circuit decided that the issues animating the protest of 
the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) were matters of public 
concern.5  Of course, the “issue[s] of homosexuals in the military, 
the sex-abuse scandal within the Catholic Church, and the political 
and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens” are matters 
of public concern.6  But none of these is the issue whose publicness 
the Fourth Circuit was called upon to consider.  That issue is 
whatever connection Matthew Snyder had to these matters.  In the 
world of speech-based torts, whether a matter is one of legitimate 
public concern depends on the content, effect, and significance of the 
plaintiff’s conduct, not the subjective and unilateral assertions of the 
defendant.  WBC must show that that connection is of public 
concern.  Otherwise, every soldier, every Catholic, etc., no matter 
how assiduously he or she has avoided the public fray, would be 
subject to targeted personal assault as long as WBC speaks under the 
mantle of some public concern, no matter how tenuously that 
concern is connected to the conduct of WBC’s target.  WBC is free 
to believe what it wants about the death of soldiers, but its beliefs do 
not render Matthew’s funeral a matter of public concern.  (Neither 
the analysis of the Fourth Circuit nor that of the district court relied 
on any distinction between Albert Snyder and his son.7  This article 
similarly does not distinguish between the two for purposes of the 
“public concern” and “public figure” analyses.). 
 
2.  The Fourth Circuit’s decision turned on the court’s determination 
that WBC’s speech, even if it was not a matter of public concern, 
was mere rhetorical hyperbole (and, thus, not provably false; and 
thus protected opinion).8  Whatever sense this reasoning makes in the 
area of public debate, it creates a perverse incentive for WBC to be 
especially abusive and inflammatory: the more hyperbolically hateful 
the speech, the more it is constitutionally protected.  By the court’s 
logic, speech about private figures enjoys constitutional immunity 
from tort claims as long as the defendant speaks with sufficient 
rhetorical flourish—that is to say, with sufficient viciousness.  This 
doctrinal borrowing from defamation makes little sense where the 
plaintiff brings an emotional distress claim.  First, when the 
 
 
5
 See 580 F.3d at 222-24. 
 
6
 Id. at 223. 
 
7
 Id. at 222 n.17. 
 
8
 580 F.3d at 220, 222-24. 
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plaintiff’s claim is based on emotional injury caused by non-provable 
speech, the state’s interest in the protection of private personality is 
greater.  The defamation plaintiff is injured by false statements of 
fact: where there is no provable factual assertion, there is little 
chance of reputational injury.  No one will believe what is clearly 
hyperbolic rhetoric.  But those same words can heighten a plaintiff’s 
emotional distress (and the more hyperbolic, the more the harm), 
whether or not the defendant’s message is verifiable.  Second, the 
value of the speech at issue, and thus the need to offer it 
constitutional protection, is lesser.  Statements meant merely to cause 
emotional injury to private plaintiffs bear only the most superficial 
resemblance to protected forms of speech. 
 
3.  There is no justification for applying the actual malice standard to 
emotional distress claims outside the public arena (and little enough 
inside).  The literal application of the actual malice standard offers 
no protection to the plaintiff claiming emotional injury from 
rhetorically hyperbolic speech.  The victim of a libel can show that 
the statement was false.  The victim of rhetorical hyperbole can 
prove or disprove nothing that will bring judicial redress.  This may 
be the cost of doing business in the public arena, but why should the 
private plaintiff be left defenseless against emotionally injurious 
speech that serves no valid communicative purpose? 
 
4.  The availability of tort remedies for injurious speech is critical if 
private individuals are to peacefully exercise their own constitutional 
rights.  The state has a substantial interest in protecting families’ 
“personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead” and in keeping 
the most intimate of moments from “unwarranted public 
exploitation.”9  Mr. Snyder should have the opportunity to show that 
WBC’s targeted picketing “was intended to cause him and his family 
substantial psychological distress,”10 not to disseminate a public 
message.11  The Fourth Circuit failed to consider whether WBC’s 
speech was the type of harassment described by the Supreme Court 
as “fundamentally different from more generally directed means of 
communication . . . .”12  There are some places that are especially 
protected from targeted verbal confrontation.13  We may soon find 
out if the sanctuary traditionally set aside for moments of private 
grieving is one of them. 
 
It is a legal commonplace that not all speech warrants constitutional 
 
 
9
 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004). 
 
10
 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 498 (1988). 
 
11
 Cf. id. at 486 (focused picketing “do[es] not seek to disseminate a message to the general 
public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way”). 
 
12
 Id. 
 
13
 See infra Part III. 
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protection.14  Not all speech, the Supreme Court has said, “advances 
society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on 
public issues.”15  Speech involving purely private matters is of “reduced 
constitutional value.”16  If such speech were immune to regulation, no 
one would be safe from injurious statements with only the most 
attenuated constitutional interest.  Justice Powell illustrated the point 
nicely by observing that if we had a constitutional order that protected 
purely private speech, “a woman of impeccable character who was 
branded a ‘whore’ by a jealous neighbor” would have no effective legal 
recourse.17  But what if the neighbor had said, “This woman, like all 
Catholics, is a whore.”?  Is this statement constitutionally protected?  
Suppose the speaker is a member of a religious group that genuinely 
believes all Catholics to be morally prostituted?  Suppose the speaker 
had said it outside the church where the woman was attending Sunday 
morning services?  Is the speech protected because, though it targets a 
private person, it purports to address a matter of public concern?  Or, is 
it protected because it is no more than rhetorical hyperbole (though the 
speaker means it to be taken as fact), the kind of speech that the Court 
once described as a “lusty and imaginative” expression of contempt?18 
By no means are these questions likely to lead to easy answers.  
But they are, of course, not merely academic queries.  WBC is a 
religious group that considers the Catholic Church a “whorehouse” 
ministered by a priesthood of child molestors.19  For WBC, the threat to 
our society represented by the Catholic Church is a matter of the utmost 
public concern, and WBC claims the right to call any Catholic a 
whore—and to do so with immunity from tort suit.  WBC believes the 
death of soldiers is to be celebrated as God’s punishment on a too-
liberal society, and it claims the right to call any soldier a “fag” whose 
death is richly deserved—and to do so with immunity from tort suit.  
WBC’s moral judgments are not, to say the least, discriminating: there 
are few who would escape its moral condemnation.  If WBC can target 
private persons under a thin constitutional mantle of public concern, if it 
can use hyperbole to shield what is no more that a personally targeted 
attack, then it is fair to wonder who among us (no matter how privately 
we order our lives) is safe from its injurious speech. 
When Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder was killed in 
Iraq, his funeral, held in Westminster, Maryland, was picketed by 
 
 
14
 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985). 
 
15
 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 
16
 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761. 
 
17
 Id. at 761 n.7. 
 
18
 Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 
(1974). 
 
19
 See Westboro Baptist Church, Upcoming Picket Schedule, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/schedule.html (last visited May 23, 2010). 
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WBC.20  The church held signs that read, “You are going to hell,” “God 
hates you,” “Thank God for dead soldiers,” and “Semper fi fags.”21  
Following the funeral, the church posted on its website 
(godhatesfags.com) an “epic” entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance 
Cpl. Matthew Snyder.”22  Matthew’s burden, as the church saw it, was 
that he had been “raised for the devil” and “taught to defy God.”23  
Albert Snyder, Matthew’s father, brought a civil action against WBC in 
federal district court, asserting a claim for intentional infliction of 
mental and emotional distress (among other causes of action).24  He was 
awarded $10.9 million in compensatory and punitive damages.25  That 
judgment was reversed by the Fourth Circuit.26 
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Fourth Circuit concluded (or seems to 
have concluded—its decision is not a model of precision and clarity) 
that as long as WBC does not state facts that are provably false, it does 
not matter 1) whether the speech at issue is of public or private concern, 
or 2) whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure.  Unless Mr. 
Snyder can prove that WBC acted with actual malice (which a plaintiff 
cannot do unless WBC states facts that are provably false), his 
emotional distress claim is constitutionally barred.  The Supreme Court 
has held that “in the area of public debate” expression of opinion 
targeted at a public official or figure, however emotionally hurtful, is 
constitutionally protected.27  It has been argued that in the area of public 
debate expressions of opinion should be protected regardless of the 
status of the plaintiff.28  But it has not been seriously suggested that the 
First Amendment protects purely personal invective delivered in the 
mere milieu of public discourse.  The Fourth Circuit comes perilously 
close to saying just that.  If the Fourth Circuit’s decision stands, Justice 
Powell’s impeccable neighbor will be effectively without legal recourse. 
I do not think that the Supreme Court intended this.  Its concern 
for the “essential dignity and worth of every human being” is strong 
and longstanding,29 as is its deference to state prerogatives to shape 
 
 
20
 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211-12 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 
21
 Id. at 212. 
 
22
 Id. 
 
23
 Id. 
 
24
 Snyder originally brought suit on five counts: defamation, intrusion upon seclusion, 
publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. 
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008). The district court granted defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment on the claims for defamation and publicity given to private life.  
Id. at 572-73.  The court held, however, that the remaining claims raised genuine issues of 
material fact.  Id. at 573. 
 
25
 Id. at 573. 
 
26
 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 
27
 Hustler Magazine, v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). 
 
28
 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40-45 (1971); cf. Deupree v. Iliff, 860 
F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 
29
 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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common-law remedies for attacks on private personality.30  Limits on 
tort remedies come at a cost.  In Snyder v. Phelps,31 the Supreme 
Court has the opportunity to make clear that there are times when the 
cost is too high.  The Court has said that “personal abuse is not in any 
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded 
by the Constitution . . . .”32  This case will test whether that 
proposition is good law. 
The Court will face a number of murky doctrinal questions.  First, 
the meaning and scope of the public concern doctrine needs to be 
clarified.33  Is it to be the law that “even the intimate and personal 
concerns [of private individuals] . . . cannot be said to be outside the 
area of ‘public or general concern’”?34  Courts decide whether a concern 
is public without reference to the status of the plaintiff.  But isn’t the 
legitimate public concern whatever connection the plaintiff has to the 
matter at issue?  Second, the reach of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell35 
needs to be delimited.  Where a statement is not objectively verifiable, 
does Hustler protect speech that is meant to injure private parties?  Does 
the literal application of the actual malice standard to private plaintiffs 
make any sense, let alone properly protect the essential dignity and 
worth of every human being?  Third, how does the captive audience 
doctrine affect the Court’s careful balancing of private and public 
interests?  The Fourth Circuit could have avoided these questions by 
holding that Mr. Snyder failed to prove at trial sufficient evidence to 
support his tort claims.36  But the court waded into murky doctrinal 
water—and managed to make things even murkier. 
Part I of this piece looks briefly at the relevant legal background: 
A) the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Falwell v. Flynt37 (the case that 
would make it to the Supreme Court as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 38), 
B) the relevant Supreme Court cases, and C) the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Snyder v. Phelps.39  Part II addresses three arguments likely 
 
 
30
 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The legitimate state 
interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on 
them by defamatory falsehood.  We would not lightly require the State to abandon this 
purpose . . . .”). 
 
31
 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009).   
 
32
 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). 
 
33
 Clarity is long overdue.  See Arlen W. Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role 
for an Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 241, 270 (1987) 
(“If the public concern doctrine called for by the [Dun & Bradstreet] plurality is to be applied by 
lower courts in any reasonable and consistent fashion, the Supreme Court must, in future cases, 
define the contours of the public concern concept and must enunciate clear standards for 
determining when a public concern is present.”). 
 
34
 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971). 
 
35
 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 
36
 See 580 F.3d 206, 227-33 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
37
 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 
38
 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 
39
 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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to be made by WBC before the Supreme Court, each of which builds on 
the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit’s Snyder opinion: A) that this case 
involves a matter of public concern; B) that the plaintiff should be 
considered a limited purpose public figure; and C) that WBC did not 
use language that can be verified as true or false (and, thus, the plaintiff 
must show that WBC acted with actual malice).  Part III considers the 
state’s substantial interest in protecting individuals, especially those 
held captive by circumstances, from personally injurious speech, and 
argues that the emotional distress tort claim supports that interest 
without threatening First Amendment freedoms. 
 
I.     THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.     Falwell v. Flynt: The Fourth Circuit’s Opinion 
 
Left to its own doctrinal devices, the Fourth Circuit probably 
would not have read the First Amendment as such a fearsome shield 
against speech-based tort suits.  More likely, it would have decided that 
WBC was adequately protected by the culpability standard of the 
common-law emotional distress claim.  In Falwell v. Flynt, the Fourth 
Circuit had already considered the argument that some emotional 
distress claims may be barred under the First Amendment.40  Following 
New York Times v. Sullivan,41 the court agreed that Larry Flynt’s parody 
ad (in which Jerry Falwell admits that his “first time” was with his 
drunken mother42) was entitled to the same level of protection afforded 
by the actual malice standard.  The court concluded that “[t]o hold 
otherwise would frustrate the intent of New York Times and encourage 
the type of self censorship which it sought to abolish.”43 
But the court did not think that “literal application of the actual 
malice standard” was appropriate in an action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.44  It based that judgment on its concern that 
“[r]equiring a plaintiff to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
of the truth in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
would add a new element to this tort, and alter its nature.”45  For the 
Fourth Circuit, the point of the actual malice standard is to focus on the 
 
 
40
 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 
41
 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 
42
 797 F.2d at 1272. 
 
43
 Id. at 1274 (“In the case at bar, Falwell is a public figure, and the gravamen of the suit is a 
tortious publication.  The defendants are, therefore, entitled to the same level of first amendment 
protection in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they received in 
Falwell’s claim for libel.  To hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of New York Times and 
encourage the type of self censorship which it sought to abolish.”). 
 
44
 Id. 
 
45
 Id. at 1275. 
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defendant’s culpability; it increases the level of fault the plaintiff must 
prove to recover in an action based upon a tortious publication.  “The 
emphasis of the actual malice standard is ‘knowing . . . or reckless.’”46 
The court concluded that this culpability standard is met when the 
emotional distress plaintiff proves his case. 
 
The first of the four elements of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress . . . requires that the defendant’s misconduct be intentional or 
reckless.  This is precisely the level of fault that New York Times 
requires in an action for defamation.  The first amendment will not 
shield intentional or reckless misconduct resulting in damage to 
reputation, and neither will it shield such misconduct which results in 
severe emotional distress.  We, therefore, hold that when the first 
amendment requires application of the actual malice standard, the 
stand-ard is met when the jury finds that the defendant’s intentional 
or reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury 
complained of.  The jury made such a finding here, and thus the 
constitutional standard is satisfied.47 
 
The Fourth Circuit knew a legal quandary when it saw one.  How 
could Falwell show that Larry Flynt published the parody with actual 
malice (i.e., knowing that it was false or with reckless disregard of its 
falsity) when it was, after all . . . a parody?  Literal application of the 
actual malice standard would make the emotional distress tort (at least 
when based on injurious speech) redundant of defamation claims.  The 
law provides a remedy for harms caused by speech that no one would 
reasonably believe was describing actual facts.  Racial slurs may be 
actionable on a theory of emotional distress.48  In such a suit, what 
would a plaintiff do to satisfy the actual malice standard?  Where is the 
objectively verifiable assertion?  It may be, as courts like to say, that 
mere insults ordinarily would not constitute extreme outrage, but one 
would think that judgment should be a question for the trier of fact. 
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the defendants’ argument that 
“since the jury found that a reader could not reasonably believe that the 
parody was describing actual facts about Falwell, it must be an opinion 
and therefore is protected by the first amendment.”49  For the court, 
whether the defendants’ statement constituted opinion is beside the 
point when the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint is infliction of 
emotional distress. 
 
 
46
 Id. 
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
 See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 219 (Cal. 1970). See generally 
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).  On the constitutionality of laws prohibiting 
hate speech, see Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational 
Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 105 n.3 (1992) (citing articles). 
 
49
 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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At common law the dichotomy between statements of fact and 
opinion was often dispositive in actions for defamation.  An action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress concerns itself with 
intentional or reckless conduct which is outrageous and proximately 
causes severe emotional distress, not with statements per se.  We 
need not consider whether the statements in question constituted 
opinion, as the issue is whether their publication was sufficiently 
outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
The defendants’ argument on this point is, therefore, irrelevant in the 
context of this tort.50 
 
Here, the court failed to see a quandary of its own making.  We 
may regret the ambiguity that keeps jurists so busy ruminating about the 
distinction between opinion and fact,51 but the distinction is not 
irrelevant for constitutional purposes.  Jerry Falwell had already lost his 
defamation argument.  The jury found that no reasonable person would 
believe that the ad parody was describing actual facts.52  The question 
before the Fourth Circuit was whether there are circumstances under 
which opinion loses its constitutional protection.53 
Chastened by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hustler Magazine 
v. Falwell,54 the Fourth Circuit (as we shall see below) focused on 
objective verifiability when it came to consider WBC’s statements at 
Matthew Snyder’s funeral.55  With single-minded attention to the 
factualness (rather than the hurtfulness) of the church’s message, the 
court looked for evidence to show that no reasonable person could think 
the church was asserting provable facts.56  Remarkably, it found that 
evidence in the very outrageousness of the church’s speech: 
 
As we have recognized, the “context and tenor” of the speech at 
issue, as well as the speaker’s use of “irreverent and indefinite 
language,” can serve to negate any impression that he is asserting 
actual facts about an individual. . . .  The general context of the 
 
 
50
 Id. at 1276. 
 
51
 The literature on the fact/opinion distinction is, needless to say, voluminous.  For a rich 
treatment of the question, see generally Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 
52
 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273. 
 
53
 Id. at 1273-76; cf. Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An 
Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 451-52 (1988) (“[T]he modern protection 
for opinion comes not from the elements of the tort of defamation, but from the first amendment.  
That the fact/opinion distinction may be irrelevant to the state definition of infliction of emotional 
distress does not, therefore, decide the matter.  The question is whether it is irrelevant under the 
first amendment.  The answer provided by Hustler v. Falwell is that the distinction is always 
relevant.  Opinion is always protected under the first amendment; in fact, its absolute protection is 
one of the most pervasive themes of modern first amendment jurisprudence.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 
54
 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 
55
 See infra Part I.C. 
 
56
 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222-26 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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speech in this proceeding is one of impassioned (and highly 
offensive) protest, with the speech at issue conveyed on handheld 
placards.  A distasteful protest sign . . . is not the medium through 
which a reasonable reader would expect a speaker to communicate 
objectively verifiable facts.57 
 
It is an odd state of affairs when the message of WBC is described 
as irreverent.  Certainly, the church thought it was conveying actual 
facts about the plaintiff’s religious standing.  That aside, the Fourth 
Circuit seems to be saying that there are no circumstances under which 
opinion loses its constitutional protection.  But that outcome would not 
be consistent with the careful, if sometimes rather subtle, balancing of 
interests that has driven the Supreme Court’s consideration of speech-
based tort claims. 
 
B.  Supreme Court Precedent: Balancing Public and Private Interests 
 
The Supreme Court has never heeded Justice Black’s admonition 
that “no law” means no law “without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or 
‘whereases.’”58  And for good reason.  Other values can be threatened 
by the talismanic invocation of free speech rights.  Free speech always 
comes at a cost.  The question is: When is the cost too high? 
Since 1964, the Court has carefully measured the competing 
weights of public discourse and private personality.  The actual malice 
standard was stable doctrine when it applied to public officials (New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 196459) and public figures (Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, 196760).  Though not quite a bright line, the public 
official/figure standard was bright enough, heightening constitutional 
review for media criticism of those who are “intimately involved in the 
resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, 
shape events in areas of concern to society at large.”61  When the Court 
turned its attention to defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs 
involving statements of public concern (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
197462), the issue was initially in doubt.  Justice Brennan had previously 
argued that New York Times protection should extend to defamatory 
falsehoods relating to private persons if the statements were matters of 
public concern (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 197163).  For 
Brennan, the prevailing interest was society’s need to learn about 
 
 
57
 Id. at 224 (internal citation omitted). 
 
58
 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 
59
 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 
60
 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 
61
 Id. at 164 (Warren, J., concurring in judgment). 
 
62
 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 
63
 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
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matters of public moment: “If a matter is a subject of public or general 
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private 
individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 
‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”64 
Ultimately, the Gertz Court concluded that the balance of 
competing interests weighed against application of the actual malice 
standard in cases involving private plaintiffs.65  Such a categorical 
privilege for matters of public concern would leave private persons—no 
matter how attenuated or involuntary their association with some matter 
of public concern—with no recourse for injury unless they could satisfy 
the demanding actual malice standard.  The Court observed that public 
officials and public figures 1) have the opportunity to counteract false 
statements, and 2) must accept the consequences of their (usually 
voluntary) involvement in public affairs.66  But it would be unfair to 
make these assumptions with regard to a private individual. 
 
He has not accepted public office or assumed an “influential role in 
ordering society.” . . .  He has relinquished no part of his interest in 
the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a 
more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by 
defamatory falsehood.  Thus, private individuals are not only more 
vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are 
also more deserving of recovery.67 
 
Having distinguished “the state interest in compensating private 
individuals from the analogous interest involved in the context of public 
persons,”68 the Court created a less demanding constitutional standard 
for suits brought by a private plaintiff on a matter of public concern.  
The Court concluded that the plaintiff has the burden of proving some 
level of fault before recovering damages, but that states “may define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability . . . .”69  Subsequently, 
the Court rejected the common-law rule on falsity—that the defendant 
must bear the burden of proving truth—in cases where the plaintiff is a 
private figure and the speech is of public concern (Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 198670).  Under Hepps, the private plaintiff 
must bear the burden of proving falsity as well as fault.71  With these 
 
 
64
 Id. at 43. 
 
65
 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 
66
 Id. at 344-45. 
 
67
 Id. at 345 (internal citation omitted). 
 
68
 Id. at 346. 
 
69
 Id. at 347.  The Court also decided that states could permit private plaintiffs to recover 
presumed or punitive damages only upon a showing of actual malice.  See id. at 348-50. 
 
70
 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
 
71
 Id. at 776 (“We believe that the common law’s rule on falsity—that the defendant must 
bear the burden of proving truth—must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the 
plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.”). 
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constitutional bulwarks in place, traditional common-law defamation 
principles obtain only where the plaintiff is a private figure and the 
speech is not a matter of public concern (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 198572). 
In the New York Times-Gertz line of cases, the Court created 
culpability requirements to ensure robust debate on public issues.  Such 
cases would involve statements (on a matter of public concern) that 
reasonably imply a false and defamatory fact.  In a separate line of 
cases, the Court fashioned constitutional protection for statements of 
public concern that do not contain a provably false factual connotation 
(Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 1970;73 Old Dominion 
Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 1974;74 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 199075). Where a statement relating to 
matters of public concern could not reasonably be interpreted as making 
a factual inference, it would receive full constitutional protection (at 
least where the plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant).76  
Here, the Court wandered deeply into the land of fine distinctions.  
Thus, the statement “Mayor Jones is a liar” might be actionable, but the 
statement “Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance when discussing 
the teachings of Marx and Lenin” would not be actionable because it 
does not contain a provably false factual connotation.77  Who can plumb 
the depths of Mayor Jones’ ignorance?  But what about the statement, 
“Mayor Jones accepts the teachings of Marx and Lenin”?  Whether this 
is provable is, I think, anybody’s guess. 
The Court also provided New York Times constitutional protection 
against emotional distress claims in the area of public debate about 
public figures (Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 198878).  In effect, the 
Court has created something close to a categorical privilege for 
statements on matters of public concern unless they are provably false.79  
The Hustler Court did not say whether statements of public concern are 
shielded from emotional distress claims where the plaintiff is a private 
figure (or, for that matter, whether statements not of public concern are 
 
 
72
 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
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 398 U.S. 6 (1970). 
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 418 U.S. 264 (1974). 
 
75
 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 
76
 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (“Hepps ensures that a statement of opinion relating to 
matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive 
full constitutional protection.”). 
 
77
 See id.; cf., e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1000 (1984) (“A statement that, on its 
face and standing alone, sounds like an assertion of fact may not be actionable.  Context is crucial 
and can turn what, out of context, appears to be a statement of fact into ‘rhetorical hyperbole,’ 
which is not actionable.”). 
 
78
 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). 
 
79
 The Supreme Court has not yet “addressed the question of whether the constitutional 
protections afforded to statements not provably false should apply with equal force to both media 
and nonmedia defendants.”  Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 n.13 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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shielded from emotional distress claims where the plaintiff is a public 
official or figure), and, if so, what level of protection they would get.80  
More generally, the Court has chosen to see the status of the plaintiff 
(i.e., whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure) and the content 
of the defendant’s speech (i.e., whether the speech is of public concern) 
as two separate forces shaping the common-law landscape.81  The Court 
has doubted the wisdom of letting judges “decide on an ad hoc basis 
which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’ and 
which do not,”82 but it has precious little wisdom of its own to offer on 
this subject.  Thus, the Court has left some important doctrinal doors 
ajar—through which defendants like WBC can blithely march under the 
banner of free speech. 
 
C.  Snyder v. Phelps: The Fourth Circuit Once More 
 
In its Snyder v. Phelps decision, the Fourth Circuit rebuked the 
district court for its focus on the status of the plaintiff.83  The district 
court determined that Matthew Snyder was not a public figure, that his 
funeral was not a public event, and that “[d]efendants [could not] by 
their own actions transform a private funeral into a public event and 
then bootstrap their position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a 
public figure.”84  For the district court, this case was simply a common-
law tort claim where 1) the defendants’ speech was directed against 
private individuals, and 2) the subject of the lawsuit was a matter of 
private concern.  The plaintiff, accordingly, could recover damages 
without clearing any constitutional hurdles. 
For the Fourth Circuit, the conclusion that the Snyders were not 
private figures “did not dispose of the Defendants’ First Amendment 
contentions.”85  In the view of the circuit court, the district court “failed 
to assess whether the pertinent statements could reasonably be 
interpreted as asserting ‘actual facts’ about an individual, or whether 
they instead merely contained rhetorical hyperbole.”86  The district 
court, in other words, had looked at the wrong line of Supreme Court 
cases.  It should have focused on the type of speech at issue (i.e., 
 
 
80
 For a multi-tiered approach to the question of constitutional protection where the plaintiff 
claims emotional distress based on speech, see Smolla, supra note 53, at 466-74. 
 
81
 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (“One can discern 
in these decisions two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to conform to the First 
Amendment. The first is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is instead a private 
figure.  The second is whether the speech at issue is of public concern.”). 
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 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
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 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008). 
 
85
 580 F.3d at 222. 
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whether it was a matter of public concern, whether it was objectively 
verifiable), not on the status of the Snyders or the circumstances 
surrounding Matthew’s funeral.87 
The Fourth Circuit simply ignored the status of the plaintiff.  It 
began its analysis by considering whether WBC’s speech was a matter 
of public concern.  The court first looked at a group of signs that, it 
assumed, were not about the Snyders—that is, they were a matter of 
public concern. 
 
The following signs displayed by the Defendants, which are similar 
in both their message and syntax, can readily be assessed together: 
“America is Doomed,” “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” 
“Pope in Hell,” “Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “Thank God for 
Dead Soldiers,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” 
“Priests Rape Boys,” and “God Hates Fags.”  As a threshold matter, 
as utterly distasteful as these signs are, they involve matters of public 
concern, including the issue of homosexuals in the military, the sex-
abuse scandal within the Catholic Church, and the political and 
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens.88 
 
Next, the court noted that some signs could be construed as mere 
personal abuse.  Two signs—”You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates 
You”—could reasonably be read as referring to “Snyder or his son 
only . . . .”89  But as it turns out, it made no difference to the Court 
whether the signs were targeted personally at Mr. Snyder or his son, for 
none of the signs could be reasonably read to assert “actual and 
provable facts.”90  Whether personal or not, the signs were “incapable of 
objective verification.”91  What did matter—the only thing that 
mattered—to the court was WBC’s use of “rhetorical hyperbole and 
figurative expression.”92  The use of such “irreverent and indefinite” 
language negated any impression that WBC was trying to state 
objectively verifiable facts.93 
 
 
87
 See id. at 222 (“The Supreme Court has created a separate line of First Amendment 
precedent that is specifically concerned with the constitutional protections afforded to certain 
types of speech, and that does not depend upon the public or private status of the speech’s 
target.”). 
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 Id. at 222-23 (footnote omitted). 
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 Id. at 224. 
 
90
 Id. at 224; see also id. (“We need not resolve this question of usage, however, because a 
reasonable reader would not interpret the statements on these two signs as asserting actual and 
provable facts.  Whether an individual is ‘Going to Hell’ or whether God approves of someone’s 
character could not possibly be subject to objective verification.  Thus, even if the reasonable 
reader understood the ‘you’ in these signs to refer to Snyder or his son, no such reader would 
understand those statements (‘You’re Going to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You’) to assert provable 
facts about either of them.”). 
 
91
 Id. at 223. 
 
92
 Id. at 224. 
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 Id. 
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When the court turned to the “Epic” published on WBC’s website, 
it had already decided that the protest was a matter of public concern 
(and that whether it was public or not didn’t much matter, anyway).  It 
was of no significance that WBC was protesting this funeral, the funeral 
of Matthew Snyder.  The Epic occasioned no second thoughts on the 
court’s behalf despite these facts: 
 
1.  The Epic was titled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. 
Matthew A. Snyder.”94 
 
2.  The Epic discusses Matthew’s life in great, if delusional, 
personal detail.  This is the Fourth Circuit’s description of the Epic: 
 
“Twenty years ago, little Matthew Snyder came into the world. . . . 
God created him and loaned/entrusted him to Albert and Julie 
Snyder.” . . . The Epic states that the Snyders “had a DUTY to 
prepare that child to serve the LORD his GOD-PERIOD! You did 
JUST THE OPPOSITE-you raised him for the devil. You taught him 
that God was a liar.” . . . The Epic also focuses on Matthew’s 
upbringing, asserting that “Albert and Julie . . . taught Matthew to 
defy his Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery.  They taught 
him how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of 
the entire world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity. . . . They also, in 
supporting satanic Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an 
idolater.” . . . After interspersing additional excerpts from the Bible, 
the Epic refers to Matthew’s service in the military, noting that he 
fought for 
 
the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in lock step 
with his evil, wicked[,] and sinful manner of life, putting him in 
the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has smoke coming 
from his nostrils and fire from his mouth!  How dumb was 
that?95 
 
3.  The Epic makes only the most fanciful connection between 
Matthew and WBC’s public concerns.  From the WBC’s Epic: 
 
God rose up Matthew for the very purpose of striking him down, so 
that God’s name might be declared throughout all the earth.  He 
killed Matthew so that His servants would have an opportunity to 
preach His words to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, the 
Maryland Legislature, and the whorehouse called St. John Catholic 
Church at Westminster where Matthew Snyder fulfilled his calling.96 
 
 
94
 Id. 
 
95
 Id. at 225 (internal citations omitted). 
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 Id. 
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Whether Matthew’s upbringing is of substantial public interest, as 
WBC contends, or a purely private matter made no difference to the 
court.  It rested its judgment on the conclusion that 1) “the Epic cannot 
be divorced from the general context of the funeral protest,” and 2) “it is 
patterned after the hyperbolic and figurative language used on the 
various signs.”97  On the latter count, WBC had going for it—in the 
court’s estimation—a general distastefulness and a lack of concern for 
grammatical niceties. 
 
[T]he Defendants interspersed strong, figurative language with 
verses from the Bible.  They utilized distasteful and offensive words, 
atypical capitalization, and exaggerated punctuation, all of which 
suggest the work of a hysterical protestor rather than an objective 
reporter of facts.98 
 
Since “[t]he general tenor of the Epic . . . serves to negate any 
impression that it was the source of any actual facts,” it could not be 
about the Snyders.99  It had to be “primarily concerned with the 
Defendants’ strongly held views on matters of public concern.”100 
The court seems to be creating a constitutional catch-22.  If WBC’s 
speech is not about the Snyders, it is protected as a matter of public 
concern; but if WBC’s speech is about the Snyders (and thus is not a 
matter of public concern), it is protected as hyperbolic rhetoric.  The 
bottom line seems to be this: Mr. Snyder’s claim of emotional injury is 
only viable if WBC speaks as an objective reporter of facts.  If affirmed, 
this would be a strong doctrinal brew.  Concocted by the Supreme Court, 
such protection against speech-based emotional distress claims was meant 
to give breathing space for contentious speech about public official and 
figures.101  To support its position, the Fourth Circuit quoted the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut: “To persuade others to his 
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to 
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in 
church or state . . . .”102  This is strange support, unless one ignores the 
concluding qualifying phrase: “[O]f men who have been, or are, 
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101
 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The sort of robust political debate 
encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold 
public office or those public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.”) 
(quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 
102
 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 310 (1940). 
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prominent in church or state . . . .”103  Mr. Snyder is prominent in 
neither, of course. 
Cantwell is instructive for another reason.  There, the Court 
reasoned that no breach of the peace had occurred because Cantwell 1) 
used no coercive means to spread his message,104 and 2) used no 
personal abuse “intended to insult or affront the hearers . . . .”105  Of 
particular importance to the Court was the evidence that Cantwell 
sought to persuade “willing listener[s]” and that his advocacy involved 
“no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse.”106  
On these facts, the Court found that Cantwell “had invaded no right or 
interest . . . of the men accosted.”107  The Court hastened to distinguish 
speech that would amount to a breach of the peace because it “consisted 
of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the 
hearer.”108  The Supreme Court has said that targeted speech (as 
opposed to abstract advocacy) may be subject to reasonable restrictions, 
but the Fourth Circuit did not consider whether WBC’s protest was this 
type of speech: personally provocative, directed to a captive audience, 
and motivated by a desire to cause that audience psychological distress.  
The question of whether WBC’s speech was of legitimate public 
concern ought not to be answered without reference to the privacy 
interests of the plaintiffs; and the question of whether WBC’s protest 
“serve[d] a reasonable communicative purpose”109 ought not to be 
answered without reference to the state’s strong interest in protecting 
private parties from emotionally injurious speech. 
 
II.     UNDER THE BANNER OF FREE SPEECH: WBC’S LINE OF DEFENSE 
 
WBC made productive use of the Fourth Circuit’s handiwork.  Its 
“Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari” anticipates its 
position before the Supreme Court, building on doctrinal ambiguities to 
argue that: A) this case involves matters of vital public interest; B) Mr. 
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 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301, 308 (1940). 
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 Id. at 309. 
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 Id. at 310. 
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 Id. at 309. 
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 Id. at 309 (“One may, however, be guilty of [breach of the peace] if he commit acts or 
make statements likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such 
eventuality be intended.  Decisions to this effect are many, but examination discloses that, in 
practically all, the provocative language which was held to amount to a breach of the peace 
consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.”) 
(emphasis added); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (“While the four-letter word 
displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally 
provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not ‘directed to the person of the hearer.’” 
(quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309)). 
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 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 499 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Snyder is a limited purpose public figure; and C) WBC did not use 
language that can be verified as true or false (and, thus, Mr. Snyder 
must show that WBC acted with actual malice).110  If nothing more, 
these arguments call for greater doctrinal definition and coherence from 
the Supreme Court.  But given the consequences that would arise if 
WBC’s arguments prevail, the Court should do more.  It needs to decide 
what limit states can set on intentionally injurious speech; it needs to 
define how broadly the common law protects the dignity and worth of 
every human being. 
 
A.     WBC argues that this case involves matters of vital public 
interest. 
 
For WBC, the matter of public concern is the same for all its 
protests: “how God is dealing with this nation . . . .”111  Of course, there 
are more direct manifestations of God’s judgment that form the specific 
content of WBC’s message: 
 
Of greatest importance is the fact that the speech at issue was speech 
on public issues.  That fact cannot be gainsaid, because the topics 
were the dying soldiers, homosexuality in the military, the sex-abuse 
scandal in the Catholic Church, and the morals of this nation.  Given 
the magnitude and gravity of the problems facing this once-great 
nation, nothing could be more important at this hour than the 
question of how God is dealing with this nation, especially on the 
battlefield.112 
 
But this reasoning, accepted without discussion by the Fourth 
Circuit, mistakes any public concern for the kind of concern that has 
traditionally shielded plaintiffs from speech-based tort claims.  The 
Supreme Court looks for a demonstrable connection between the 
plaintiff and some matter of public interest.  The defendant must be able 
to argue, credibly, that, given the “content, form, and context” of its 
message,113 there is something about this plaintiff that “requires special 
protection to ensure that ‘debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.’”114  The reality is that there are not two separate 
forces shaping the common-law landscape.  The status of the plaintiff 
and the content of the defendant’s speech are as inseparable as the 
 
 
110
 Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari at 14-19, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 
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 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (quoting 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). 
 
114
 Id. at 762 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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dancer from the dance. 
Case after case illustrates the point that WBC’s speech is protected 
only if the conduct of Matthew Snyder is of legitimate public concern.  
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,115 the plaintiff was accused of being part 
of a dangerous communist conspiracy. Elmer Gertz was neither a public 
official nor a public figure.  The question before the Supreme Court was 
“whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory 
falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a 
public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for 
the injury inflicted by those statements.”116  The answer would turn out 
to be that a media defendant does enjoy some degree of constitutional 
protection.  Of critical significance to the Court was the fact that the 
case “involved expression on a matter of undoubted public concern.”117  
That concern was not whether there was a communist conspiracy that 
threatened the United States.  Or whether lawyers (Gertz was an 
attorney) were bad people.  The concern was whether Elmer Gertz was 
a “Communist-fronter” and whether, as part of a communist conspiracy, 
he had worked to “frame” a Chicago policeman who was being 
prosecuted for homicide.118  In short, Gertz had been “linked” to 
Communist activity.  Had the concern been defined more broadly—say, 
the role of lawyers as a front for a communist conspiracy—the 
defendant could have targeted any lawyer.  The “link” would not have 
been needed, and no lawyer, no matter how far removed from things 
public (or communistic), would have been safe from the accusation that 
he was a menace to the nation. 
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Supreme Court refused to equate 
“public controversy” for defamation purposes with all controversies of 
interest to the public.119  The lurid details of Mary Alice Firestone’s 
divorce proceedings (which were described by the Florida Supreme 
Court as a “cause celebre”) were not the “sort of ‘public controversy’ 
referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely 
wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading 
public.”120  Under the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, the defendant could 
have manufactured a public controversy by discussing the sad state of 
modern marriage, or the erotic zest of celebrity satyrs, or who knows 
what.  Provided that the defendant had spoken in terms so outrageous 
they would not be objectively verifiable, Ms. Firestone would have had 
no cause of action. 
In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v. 
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Bresler,121 the matter of public concern was whether the plaintiff’s 
negotiating positions amounted to “blackmail,” not sordid doings in the 
world of zoning variances; in Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association, 
Inc.,122 the public concern was whether the plaintiff was a spy, not the 
threat of Soviet espionage; in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Hepps,123 whether the plaintiff “had links to organized crime”124 was the 
matter of public concern; and in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,125 the 
question of public interest was whether the plaintiff had perjured 
himself, not violence in high-school athletics.  Even the Rosenbloom 
plurality, which sought to extend constitutional protection to all matters 
of public concern without regard to the plaintiff’s status, insisted that 
“the public focus is on the conduct of the participant [i.e., the plaintiff] 
and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct . . . .”126 
None of these cases suggests that the subjective and unilateral 
assertions of the defendant are sufficient to make any issue a matter of 
legitimate concern to the public.  WBC must show that the content, 
effect, and significance of Matthew Snyder’s conduct requires special 
protection to ensure robust public debate.  Of course, it can make no 
such showing.  Or, to put it another way, it could make the same 
showing about every soldier.  But soldiers, just because they are 
soldiers, cannot be dragged into the public arena on the premise that the 
military conflict of which they are a part (or something even vaguer) is 
a public concern.  Otherwise, no soldier is safe from personal verbal 
assault.  The only aspect of Matthew Snyder’s conduct that bears some 
connection to WBC’s concerns was his military service.  Though the 
significance of that conduct cannot be underestimated, it does not have 
a public focus.  The significance of his death belongs to those who now 
wish to be let alone to mourn Matthew and honor his sacrifice. 
 
B.     WBC argues that “there is a viable basis for concluding 
that [Mr. Snyder] is a limited purpose public figure.”127 
 
Perhaps this argument is not meant to be taken seriously.  Support 
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(U.S. Jan. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 271323. 
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for the contention is a bit far-fetched: 
 
*  Mr. Snyder “chose to have the funeral at a Catholic church,  
knowing the public’s attention on this sex-abuse scandal.”128 
 
*  “Petitioner’s son voluntarily enlisted knowing the war in Iraq  
was of national importance and interest.”129 
 
*  “Petitioner spoke with the media about his son, attempting to  
influence the public to believe his son was a hero.”130 
 
But the evidence brought forward by WBC illustrates how easy it 
is to erode delicate doctrinal distinctions between the public and private 
spheres.  For WBC’s argument depends on the Fourth Circuit’s ready 
acceptance that, regardless of the plaintiff’s conduct, issues of public 
import are necessarily of legitimate public concern in the context of tort 
suits.  WBC would establish this equation: the more likely that speech is 
a matter of public concern, the less likely that the plaintiff is a private 
figure.  The content of the defendant’s speech would determine how the 
court understands the status of the plaintiff.  But the Supreme Court has 
rejected the proposition that “mere newsworthiness” justifies the 
application of the New York Times standard to private plaintiffs.131  “A 
private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure 
just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts 
public attention.”132  It is the “nature and extent of an individual’s 
participation in the particular controversy” that determines the status of 
the plaintiff.133  So, the equation ought to be this: the more private a 
figure the plaintiff is, the less likely that speech about him is a matter of 
public concern.134  The status of the plaintiff should determine how the 
court understands the content of the defendant’s speech. 
If the latter equation is right, then WBC’s speech has no legitimate 
public interest, for the Snyders are purely private figures.  Elmer Gertz 
was a private figure “even though he voluntarily associated himself with 
a case that was certain to receive extensive media exposure.”135  Ilya 
Wolston was a private figure even though he “voluntarily chose not to 
appear before the grand jury [investigating Soviet intelligence activity], 
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likely to implicate matters of public importance than will speech allegedly defaming public 
officials or public figures.”). 
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knowing that his action might be attended by publicity . . . .”136  The 
public attention that Matthew’s funeral attracted does not make his 
father a public figure.  Mary Alice Firestone was not a public figure 
even though her divorce was a “cause celebre.”137  Whatever publicity 
Matthew’s funeral occasioned, Mr. Snyder did not “engage[] the 
attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of the 
issues involved.”138  The fact that he spoke to the media does not 
suggest that he “sought to use the press conferences as a vehicle by 
which to thrust [himself] to the forefront of some unrelated controversy 
in order to influence its resolution.”139 
Indeed, Mr. Snyder was thrust into the glare of public controversy.  
The Court has said that “those charged with defamation cannot, by their 
own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public 
figure.”140  But, as the district court concluded, it was the WBC defendants 
who thrust the Snyder family into the unwelcome glare of national media 
coverage, “transform[ing] a private funeral into a public event . . . .”141  
The district court rightly rejected WBC’s attempt to “bootstrap [its] 
position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a public figure.”142 
 
*     *     * 
 
The connection between Mr. Snyder and the topics of concern to 
WBC is too attenuated to justify constitutional protection for speech 
that amounts to no more than a personal attack.  WBC targeted a private 
figure for emotional injury; it clothed personal abuse in the dress of 
public concern.  Whatever social value, if any, may be derived from 
WBC’s speech is far outweighed by the state’s interest in protecting 
private individuals from this kind of unprompted verbal attack. 
 
C.     WBC argues that it did not use language that can be 
verified as true or false.  Thus, Mr. Snyder must show that 
WBC acted with actual malice. 
 
As a matter of religious principle, WBC ought forcefully to reject 
the notion that it does not mean what it says, but it takes refuge in the 
proposition that the more “hyperbolic” its speech (the more its 
religious viewpoint is reduced to rhetorical show), the more it is 
constitutionally protected. 
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[T]he Fourth Circuit was correct in finding that the language of 
respondents is not language which can be verified as true or 
false. . . .  The rule of law about hyperbolic and objectively 
unverifiable language being protected is well-established, and does 
not need to be revisited . . . .143 
 
If the Fourth Circuit’s judgment is affirmed, groups like WBC will 
be encouraged to be as distasteful as possible.  To protect themselves, 
such groups need only disguise personally derogatory language as 
public discourse and redouble their rhetorical efforts.  Though it is hard 
to imagine how WBC could do that, it hardly needs the invitation. 
If there is something unseemly in WBC’s willingness to concede, 
if only for the sake of argument, that its message was rhetorical 
hyperbole, there is something downright offensive about the 
condescension with which the Fourth Circuit treats WBC and its 
message.  Why would a reasonable reader take as rhetorically 
hyperbolic WBC’s description of the Catholic Church as a “pedophile 
machine”?144  Perhaps the reasonable reader would understand that 
some of WBC’s assertions about the Catholic Church (or the United 
States, or Matthew Snyder, ) do not contain demonstrable facts, but they 
are certainly assertions that WBC thought were factual and presented as 
true.  It is almost as though the court were treating WBC’s protest as 
some sort of religious parody, as though it ought to be accompanied (as 
was the Falwell parody ad) with a disclaimer that the message was not 
meant to be taken seriously.  Because WBC’s message is not verifiable, 
it cannot be the basis of a defamation claim, but whether WBC meant 
what it said and meant that message to cause emotional distress—that 
should be taken seriously.  WBC’s intent is relevant not only to the 
merits of Mr. Snyder’s tort claim but to the question of whether that 
claim ought to be constitutionally barred. 
The Fourth Circuit was wrong when it stated that adjudicating a 
claim for emotional distress did not require consideration of whether 
the defendant’s statement is opinion or fact.  Where the plaintiff is a 
public official or figure, opinion on matters of public concern warrants 
constitutional protection.  But where the private plaintiff brings an 
emotional distress claim, a different constitutional calculus is 
appropriate: the state’s interest in the protection of private personality 
is greater, and the value of First Amendment protection is lesser.  In 
defamation cases, a lack of objective verifiability lessens the plaintiff’s 
reputational or dignitary injury.  No one will believe matters that are 
not provably true or false.  In emotional distress cases, however, 
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rhetorical hyperbole may serve to heighten the psychological injury, 
whether people believe the defendant’s message or not.  Further, the 
state has a compelling interest in the protection of truthful statements; 
if some meritorious suits fail because the plaintiff cannot prove falsity, 
that is a cost we pay to ensure robust public debate.145  But the state has 
no interest in the protection of statements that are meant to wound 
private plaintiffs.  The speech-based emotional distress suit does not 
operate to restrict public discourse; it restricts only the use of speech to 
inflict injury, the use of words as weapons.146  Mr. Snyder did not bring 
suit to stop WBC from spreading its message.  He brought suit to stop 
the church from using its speech to target him for injury—at a time 
when he was likely to be especially vulnerable to and unable to avoid 
the attack.147  If a private plaintiff can show common-law malice—that 
is, that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused emotional 
distress—the constitutional standard ought to be satisfied (and, thus, in 
a roundabout way, the Fourth Circuit got it right when it found that 
Falwell’s suit was not constitutionally barred).  Hustler may create 
“breathing space” for robust debate about public affairs, but the literal 
application of the actual malice standard would leave private plaintiffs 
helpless against malicious speakers.  The victim of a libel gets a chance 
to show that the statement was false.  The victim of rhetorical 
hyperbole can prove or disprove nothing that will bring judicial 
redress.  Indeed, the standard invites malicious speakers to greater 
heights of hysterical protest. 
There is no justification for applying the actual malice standard 
outside the public arena.  (And little enough inside the public arena.  
Why not just bar speech-based emotional distress suits against public 
officials and figures?  Who would reasonably think that Jerry Falwell’s 
“first time” was a drunken tryst with his mother in an outhouse.  And 
how would Falwell prove that Hustler acted with actual malice?  It 
would be more than a bit ludicrous for him to argue that, in fact, it was 
not his first time—and Larry Flynt knew it!)  The Supreme Court was 
probably right to decide that a public figure ought not to recover 
damages for emotional harm based on statements that are not 
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objectively verifiable.  The First Amendment shields “many things done 
with motives that are less than admirable . . . in the area of public debate 
about public figures.”148  But the Court should have stopped there.  The 
actual malice standard offers no viable defense to the kinds of 
statements that inflict emotional distress.  Its literal application would 
be, as Rodney Smolla says, “nonsensical.”149  Perhaps Jerry Falwell 
should be made to take it, but public debate will be just as robust if 
private plaintiffs have legal recourse for intentionally injurious 
speech.150  Where the plaintiff has no connection to the public fray, the 
state’s interest in protecting private personality should pierce the First 
Amendment shield. 
 
III.  SNYDER V. PHELPS: WEIGHING THE INTERESTS 
 
The Supreme Court has spoken eloquently about “the interests 
decent people have for those whom they have lost.”151  This privacy 
interest is, of course, a deeply personal one.  “Family members have a 
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to 
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, 
tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the 
deceased person who was once their own.”152  But the state, too, has a 
significant stake in ensuring the survival of “well-established cultural 
tradition[s]” that signify “the respect a society shows for the deceased 
and for the surviving family members.”153 
The state has a broader interest in protecting individuals made 
vulnerable by circumstances to unwanted speech.  Though “‘we are 
often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
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objectionable speech,”‘ the constitutional commitment to open 
discourse “does not mean we must be captives everywhere.”154  The 
Supreme Court has unhesitatingly protected the “unwilling listener” 
when protesters invade residential privacy. 
 
[A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own 
walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid 
intrusions.  Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not 
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that 
the government may protect this freedom.155 
 
By analogy, the Supreme Court has applied the state’s interest in 
residential privacy to medical privacy,156 and the doctrine has been 
extended by lower courts to houses of worship157 and funerals.158  The 
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Supreme Court has been especially severe with targeted or “focused 
picketing,”159 which the Court considers “fundamentally different from 
more generally directed means of communication . . . .”160  Targeted 
picketing “generally do[es] not seek to disseminate a message to the 
general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in 
an especially offensive way.”161  Even when protesters do have a 
communicative purpose, however, their activity may “inherently” 
intrude on privacy.162  The home becomes something less than a home 
under the “tensions and pressures” created by knowledge of protest 
outside the door.163  Indeed, these psychological pressures can have a 
“devastating effect” on our peace and privacy.164   
It is always a bad business when rights collide.  In the pantheon of 
rights, freedom of speech may have a preferred position, but it is no 
license to disregard the rights of others.165  Supported by the “very basic 
right to be free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter we do not 
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want,”166 we carry with us a measure of protection from confrontational 
acts,167 when we go to and from work,168 when we view display 
advertising,169 when we use the city transit system,170 and when we seek 
out medical care.171  Where there is room, literally, for disagreement (in 
the meeting hall, park, street corner, or public thoroughfare), and where 
there is opportunity for the unwilling recipient of someone else’s 
communication to look the other way (in both literal and metaphorical 
senses), “First Amendment values inalterably prevail.”172  But when 
communication is forced upon us, the state has a substantial interest in 
protecting our right to be let alone.173 
Old as the saying is, it remains true that “whether the pitcher hits 
the stone, or the stone the pitcher, it’s a bad business for the pitcher.”174  
Some rights are simply more fragile than others; without state support, 
they are bound to lose ground to their hardier counterparts.  Alan 
Brownstein usefully observes that when unequally strong rights collide, 
a policy of non-involvement by the state will subordinate the weaker to 
the stronger right.175  To illustrate the point, Brownstein considers a 
protest at a house of worship (and, for our purposes, we may easily 
substitute a protest at a funeral).  The right to worship often presupposes 
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an environment conducive to spiritual activities.  What happens when 
protest activity destroys the requisite sense of religious sanctuary?  
Brownstein suggests—rightly, I think—that a policy of non-
involvement by the state will subordinate the right to worship 
peacefully to the right to speak loudly.  “The formal equality of a policy 
of non-regulation will result in substantive inequality.”176  Formal 
equality “does not accommodate freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion.  Rather, it sacrifices the latter right to protect the exercise of 
the former right.”177  More generally, it ignores the fundamental 
principle that “the right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be placed 
in the scales with the right of others to communicate.”178 
Tort liability can, at a minimum, maintain some degree of 
substantive equality of rights.  Federal and state statutes can protect those 
private sanctuaries where we ought to be let alone: let alone to worship,179 
let alone to mourn the dead.180  But tort liability can provide a more 
elastic remedy against egregious forms of misconduct meant to disrupt 
and distress.181  Emotional distress claims are well suited to suggest the 
outer limits of civil tolerance for offensive speech.  Because the bar an 
emotional distress claimant must clear is a high one, such cases provide a 
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way to establish a narrow limitation on speech that is by definition meant 
to cause harm.  To not provide a remedy for psychologically injurious 
speech truly would be to sacrifice one set of rights for another. 
Nor does adjudication of tort suits require any retreat from the First 
Amendment principle that civil courts should not “intermeddle in 
internal ecclesiastical disputes.”182  Mr. Snyder’s claim can be resolved 
by the neutral and generally applicable principles of tort law.  Tort 
claims do not ask the Court to render a decision about “discipline, faith, 
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law,”183 to 
“second-guess ecclesiastical decisions made by hierarchical church 
bodies,”184 or to determine “the correctness of an interpretation of 
canonical text . . . .”185  Such claims do not demand a judicial judgment 
about the truth or falsity of religious belief.186  To the extent that 
religious entities are held responsible for their misconduct, the burden 
they suffer is “merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and 
otherwise valid provision.”187 
It is entirely consistent with legal precedent to hold religious 
groups liable in tort when their religious advocacy subjects others to 
emotional distress.  The right of free exercise has always meant more 
than the right to believe.  Thomas Jefferson understood it to mean that 
government could not “restrain the profession or propagation of 
[religious] principles . . . .”188  If religious freedom leaves “all men . . . 
free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of 
religion,”189 by the same token there are times when we should be 
equally free to avoid unwanted and offensive religious advocacy.  While 
“[r]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith are and 
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ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be,”190 tort 
liability protects the rights of others to choose religious belief or to 
choose none at all.191 
The Hustler Court was concerned that “‘[o]utrageousness’ in the 
area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness 
about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the 
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a 
particular expression.”192  Perhaps so, but in the funeral of a private 
individual we might find “a principled standard”193 by which to 
circumscribe emotional distress claims within a safe constitutional 
perimeter.  Where discourse is not, in fact, of public concern, where it is 
targeted to a private audience unwilling to receive it but unable to avoid 
it, where its purpose is to injure, then its restriction is little threat to free 
speech values; where public concern is a mask for mere personal abuse, 
private individuals should have full legal recourse to secure their right 
to be let alone. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
“[T]he rights and values of private personality far transcend mere 
personal interests.”194 
 
So what shall become of our impeccable neighbor?  I think she 
deserves her day in court, even though most speech-based emotional 
distress claims are unlikely to survive summary judgment.  (There is not 
much speech anymore that makes us want to cry out, “Outrageous!”)  
 
 
190
 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
191
 Cf. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 779 (Okla. 1989) (“No real 
freedom to choose religion would exist in this land if under the shield of the First Amendment 
religious institutions could impose their will on the unwilling and claim immunity from secular 
judicature for their tortious acts.”) (footnote omitted). 
 
192
 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).  Cf. Paul T. Hayden, Religiously 
Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon 
against “Other People’s Faiths,” 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 580 (1993) (Emotional distress 
claims “are ill defined, requiring the trier of fact in each case to render an ad hoc judgment about 
the outrageousness of the particular defendant’s particular conduct.”); Douglas Laycock, The 
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 45-46 (describing tort suits based on religious 
speech as “characterized by attempts to incite the jury to fear and hatred of a strange faith.”); 
Massey, supra note 48, at 121 (“Hustler can thus be seen to be a repudiation of pluralism as a 
foundation for free speech, but an even deeper meaning may be derived from the case.  If 
‘outrageousness’ were to have been recognized as an exception from free speech, the standards of 
every community would prevail, thus regulating public discourse at the level of the most 
restrictive community.  Alternatively, if some ‘objective’ standard of ‘reasonableness’ were to be 
employed in testing ‘outrageousness,’ the standards of the community most ‘objectively 
reasonable’ would govern.  In either case, the prevailing mode of legal thought would have been 
distinctly culturally authoritarian, for the values of one group would control all others.”). 
 
193
 Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 55. 
 
194
 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 782 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
32 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO   
Whether or not the alleged harlotry of the Catholic Church is a matter of 
public concern, there must be some demonstrable connection between our 
neighbor and that concern to justify special constitutional protection for 
speech branding her a whore, some connection greater than the mere fact 
that our neighbor is Catholic.  It is not a matter of civility, but of civil-
ness; we do not have to be nice, but we do have to live with one another. 
In its cases dealing with speech-based tort claims, the Supreme 
Court has spent almost fifty years juggling constitutional and common-
law concerns.  It would, no doubt, be a great relief to find some way to 
end the sport, perhaps by adopting a categorical principle that protects 
abusive speech unless it amounts to “fighting words.”195  But other 
forms of speech, if not quite outside the constitutional pale, do not 
warrant protection from tort suit.  Where speech is directed at a private 
individual, especially one unwilling to hear but unable to escape the 
speaker’s message, the elements of the emotional distress claim more 
than satisfy the appropriate constitutional standard.  Indeed, such a 
standard can help create a civil space where both robust advocacy and 
the freedom to avoid robust advocacy can flourish. 
Matthew Snyder died in service to his country, but the injuries that 
took his life left a legacy of trauma for his family.  The state’s interest 
in protecting—at least for a moment of mourning—the peace and 
privacy of the Snyder family is a substantial one.  The Fourth Circuit 
failed to protect that interest.  It is now the Supreme Court’s opportunity 
to decide whether our nation’s profound commitment to the contentious 
discussion of public issues is also a license for egregiously intrusive and 
injurious speech. 
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